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Metaphysics of Axiological Realism
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Kaziemierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz (Poland)
Résumé : L’article présente les propositions principales de la métaphysique
du réalisme axiologique de Tadeusz Czeżowski, l’un des représentants éminents
de l’École de Lvov-Varsovie. La thèse soutenue par Czeżowski est que les va-
leurs ne sont pas des propriétés de n’importe quel genre, mais qu’elles consti-
tuent des notions transcendentales au sens de Duns Scot (et pas au sens de
Thomas d’Aquin). Une des conséquences de cette position est que le réalisme
de Czeżowski a la forme d’un non-naturalisme. La position prise par Czeżowski
n’est pas tout à fait claire ni élaborée en détails ; pour des raisons discutées
dans le présent texte, il est possible de considérer les valeurs comme des sortes
d’états de choses non-naturels, qui sont les correspondants des phrases axiolo-
giques pertinentes.
Abstract: The paper presents the main assumptions of the metaphysics of
axiological realism of Tadeusz Czeżowski, one of the eminent representatives of
the Lvov-Warsaw School. Czeżowski’s major thesis is that values are not prop-
erties of any kind, but they are transcendental concepts in the understanding
of Duns Scotus (and not that of Thomas Aquinas). One of the consequences
of such a view is that his realism has a form of non-naturalism. Czeżowski’s
position is not completely clear and elaborated in all details; it is possible, for
some reasons discussed in the text, to regard values as a kind of non-natural
states of aﬀairs which are correlates of relevant axiological propositions.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present the application of Czeżowski’s meta-
physics to the defense of axiological realism understood as a form of
metaphysical realism1. Axiological realism held by Czeżowski is an
original combination of the medieval metaphysics, Brentanism and non-
naturalism. Axiological realism is a view which can be deﬁned as a
negation of axiological antirealism. Axiological antirealism claims that
Philosophia Scientiæ, 12 (1), 2008, 57–74.
1Tadeusz Czeżowski ( 1889-1981) was one of the closest pupils of Kazimierz Twar-
dowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. For more information on the Lvov-
Warsaw School see [Woleński 1989].
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axiological propositions: evaluations and norms do not have any logical
values or that they are always false (as error-theory claims), and that
values are not in the things of themselves, but they are rather mere pro-
jections; they are just feelings that we project onto the world. Axiological
realism has two forms: naturalism and non-naturalism.
Axiological non-naturalism was for Czeżowski the only possible op-
tion since he was convinced that axiological propositions are true or false,
and it is impossible to infer axiological propositions from natural propo-
sitions, that is propositions representing natural facts (in other words it
is not possible to “deduce” values from being).
2 The reasons of realism and non-naturalism
The evidence that axiological propositions have one of two logical values
is delivered by the analysis of language and the usage of the expressions
representing logical values; ‘it is true that. . . ’ and ‘it is false that. . . ’.
Czeżowski made a very simple observation that the propositions ‘Truth-
fulness is good’ and ‘It is true that truthfulness is good’ are meaningful
[Czeżowski 1989, 144].
It is also worth noting that the best known explanation of the exis-
tence of inferences in the domain of axiological discourse consists in the
assumption that axiological sentences have logical values whose bearers
are propositions. As an example of the inference in the domain of ax-
iological discourse may serve the following reasoning [Czeżowski 1989,
107]:
(P1) If truthfulness is good, then one shall tell the truth.
(P2) Truthfulness is good.
Then:
(3) One shall tell the truth.
Since Czeżowski, like the whole tradition to which he belonged, re-
jected the deﬂationist conception of truth and approved of the classical
deﬁnition of truth, he could not neglect the linguistic facts previously
mentioned, and he had to ﬁnd an adequate truth-maker for axiological
sentences. Thus, it is clear that Czeżowski was perfectly aware of “Frege’s
point” or “Searle’s problem”2 Czeżowski, like many other thinkers, was
persuaded by Moore that correct deduction of axiological propositions
2Peter Geach made it clear that we believe that the status of an argument as valid
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from natural ones is impossible. The crucial thing here was Moore’s
warning against ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ based on his famous ‘open
question argument’3. Czeżowski never analyzed that argument but he
accepted it without reservation. However, Czeżowski could not accept
the metaphysics of axiological realism defended by Moore because for
Moore expressions relevant to axiological discourse, for example ‘good’,
‘bad’, ‘beautiful’, ‘valuable’ and their synonyms, are predicates denoting
simple, indeﬁnable, and, in Brentanian terms, ‘unpresentable’ object’s
properties, that is properties which, as Hume and Kant would say, ‘make
no addition’ to the object.
3 The concept of property
Let us note that there is no standard understanding of property in the
Brentanist metaphysics, for example, Meinong distinguishes properties
in an object (Sosein) (object’s constituents or parts, in terms of clas-
sical metaphysics: ‘accidents’) and properties of an object (Sein) or,
in Findlay’s and Parsons’ terms, “nuclear” properties (like for example
green, round) and “extranuclear” properties like existent/non-existent,
simple/complex, possible/impossible. Brentano himself rejected proper-
ties as an ontological category altogether [Chrudzimski 2004].
A property in the Czeżowskian psycho-ontology is understood as a
depends, at least in part, on the words not shifting in meaning as we move from
premise to premise. However, if there is no common thing predicated by relevant
sentences, it is hard to see what their meanings have in common in the context of
a given argument. This is what Geach has called The Frege Point, but it has been
also called Frege/Geach/Searle Problem in honor of its earliest discussants [Lenman
2004]. Geach also observed that “A thought may have just the same content whether
you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now
unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition” [Geach 1965, 449].Geach
provided the following example of reasoning:
(1) If tormenting the cat is bad, getting your brother to do it is bad.
(2) Tormenting the cat is bad.
And, hence,
(3) Getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.
3Moore reasons: if axiological properties were identical with natural properties,
then it would be odd to ask: “I know this activity is pleasurable, but is it morally
good?” After all, if being pleasurable just is the property of being morally good,
then to ask this would be like asking, “I know this activity is pleasurable, but it is
pleasurable”. Since the original question is ‘open’ rather than silly or self answering,
the identity must not obtain. Since exactly the same point can be made regarding any
putative identity between a moral property and a natural property, Moore concludes
that no such identity is possible [Lenman, 2004].
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constituent of an object, which is distinguished in an object by the pro-
cess of abstraction (abstraction is the process of the mental analysis of
an object). It can be thought of an object (represented) by a subject,
or we may also say that a property is a presentable constituent of an
object [Czeżowski 1938, 31]4. The picture below illustrates Czeżowski’s
classiﬁcation of properties.
properties
sensorial
simple
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white)
complex
(red and
white)
non-sensorial
simple,
(equality,
duration)
complex
(relation, square)
The ontology of properties is, as has been mentioned above, closely
related to the ontology of mind defended by Czeżowski, and the crucial
role is played here by the notion of presentation. In Czeżowski’s view,
a presentation may be a sense perception, which directly brings object’s
natural properties before the mind (an intuitive act), or it may be a
discursive and abstract act bringing a given property before the mind
by for example a deﬁnition [Czeżowski 1959, 35–36]5. The domain of
presentations may be illustrated as follows.
4It does not mean that a property is a kind of entia rationis, a ﬁction or only a
product of mental operations. However, the concept of property and the concept of
individual (substance) are not absolute metaphysical categories but they are rather
relative concepts. A substance is, according to Czeżowski, the referent of a sentence’s
subject (proper names, deﬁnite description or deictic expressions). Thus, a property
of a substance is a constituent of the referent of a speciﬁc linguistic expression. A
substance is not, however, a linguistic construction (and hence a property is not such
a construct either). The essential role in the determination of which entity is the
referent of a relevant linguistic expression is played by the spatial-temporal position
of the entity which candidates to the role of the substance. A substance does not lack
its own immanent constituents and, therefore, it is not a thing in Brentano’s reistic
sense, but it is not a class of qualities as Mach held, either. A substance is a whole
composed of constituents which can be grasped by means of mental analysis.
5Concepts are symbolic, which means that they present objects indirectly by
means of signs of a natural or a technical language. Concepts are abstract: they
result from the act of distinguishing of an object’s parts. The division of an object
into its parts (mental division) is necessary to build a concept of an object by a de-
scription or by a deﬁnition. Concepts are discursive, which means that they consist
of parts mentioned in description or in deﬁnition. Analytic concepts are produced by
abstraction; they are derived from ideas of objects (the concepts concerning objects
of everyday life experience), and synthetic concepts are constructed in an arbitrary
way from parts of analytic concepts (for example the golden mountain).
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It follows from this that a property of an object which does not be-
long to the object’s description is impossible6. If Czeżowski is right at
this point (concerning the nature of property), then, axiological real-
ism in the form defended by Moore (in Poland Tatarkiewicz held the
same view [Tatarkiewicz 1971, 269]) is impossible because all sentences
containing axiological predicates would be false (since, as will be demon-
strated below, there are no properties which would be denoted by these
predicates). Therefore, it is extremely important for a Brentanist like
Czeżowski (sensitive to language analysis) to ﬁnd metaphysics which
could serve as a ground for axiological realism.
4 Non-predicative, propositional and tran-
scendental concept of values
The arguments against the predicative conception of values are similar to
the reasons of non-predicative notion of existence therefore I will present
them together.
The ﬁrst reason is based in principle on Hume’s and Kant’s views.
An existent object and a non-existent object do not diﬀer in content,
or as Meinong would say: they do not diﬀer with regard to the nuclear
properties, the same may be said about values, and, hence, a judgment
about existence and a judgment about values make no addition to the
description of an object [Czeżowski 1938, 4]. Therefore, existence and
values are not properties. The argument in this form seems to be valid
in spite of the fact that there is a diﬀerence in content between a presen-
tation of an existent object and a presentation of a non-existent object
(the point was observed by Jaquette [Jaquette 1986, 435]7.
6But someone may object here and insist that there is a clear diﬀerence between
‘being presented’ by a conscious subject and ‘characterizing an object’, ‘making ad-
dition to an object’ or to its description. It is still possible — one may argue — that
something characterizes an object but we are not able to percept or think of it in any
way because of the limited capacity of presentation. Then the question arises: how
is it possible that a property (the corresponding predicate) makes no addition to the
object’s description (if it made any addition, one could present it) but it characterizes
an object? Some Brentanists would rather say that if a property makes an addition
to the object (to its description) and it is possible that someone presents it, then such
an entity characterizes an object, and conversely.
7Jaquette observes that “Thinking about the round square is undoubtedly diﬀer-
ent than thinking about the existent round square. But this does not mean that
the existent round square is a diﬀerent intentional object than the round square.
Meinong following Twardowski, distinguishes between the act, content, and object of
psychological presentations. The content of an assumption about the round square
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The second reason is that since axiological sentences are true or false
(as Czeżowski claimed), then they are, according to the Brentanian
psycho-ontology, expressions of axiological judgments. The nature of
judgment is explained by Czeżowski in terms of the so called ‘idiogenetic
theory of judgment’, which embraces two essential claims [Łukasiewicz
2006, 188]:
(1) each judgment is reducible to the existential judgment; that is to
the judgment asserting the existence of an object
(2) no judgment is a combination of a subject and a predicate.
The axiological judgment does not satisfy (1) because it asserts the value
of an object (as will be demonstrated below), and not its existence, but it
satisﬁes (2): the axiological judgment as a judgment is not a combination
of a subject and a predicate. It follows from this that the judgment ‘a
is good’ does not contain any predicate. The word ‘good’, according to
the idiogenetic theory of judgment, is only an apparent predicate (the
same may be said about the word ‘beautiful’ and their synonyms).
The third reason was delivered by the analysis of the syntactic struc-
ture of expressions composed of such words as ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘necessary’
and ‘beautiful’, and according to this analysis, existence and values are
not any properties because they are not symbolized in language by pred-
icates. Such words as ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘necessary’ and ’beautiful’ are only
morphologically similar to predicates but, in fact, they are not predi-
cates. They are sentential functors because they occur in such construc-
tions as, for example, ‘It is necessary that. . . ’, ‘It is good that. . . ’, ‘It is
beautiful that. . . ’, or ‘It is true that. . . ’. It is of course permissible to
say:
‘The blue sky is beautiful’
as it is possible to say:
‘The sky is blue’
But the sentence ‘The blue sky is beautiful’ is equivalent to the sen-
tence:
‘It is beautiful that the sky is blue’.
or to the sentence
‘It is beautiful that for some x: (x is a sky) and (x is blue)’.
is diﬀerent than the content of an assumption about the existent round square. The
lived-through psychological experience of each of these assumptions is phenomeno-
logically distinct. But the intentional object of the assumptions may be identical.”
[Jaquette 1986, 435].
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However, it is not possible to interpret ‘The sky is blue’ in the same
way because the linguistic construction ‘It is blue that. . . ’ cannot result
in any sentence [Czeżowski 1965, 38]. More generally, we say that the
sentence
‘a exists’
may be translated into the sentence:
‘It is true that for some x: x is a’
or into:
‘It is true that there is such an x that x is a’ 8.
5 Modi essendi
Let me now following Czeżowski introduce the concept of modi essendi
which is crucial for his metaphysics.
Czeżowski says that:
In all these examples there occurs a sentence composed of
modus and dictum (if we use the classical terminology);
modus is the expression: ‘It is necessary that. . . ’, ‘It is true
that. . . ’ etc., dictum is the sentence following modus. Today
we call modus a sentential functor. The circumstance that
modal functors (necessary, possible), the functor of assertion
(it is true that. . . ) and the functor of evaluation (good, beau-
tiful) do require as their complement a sentence (and not a
name, as other adjectives do when they play the role of an
attribute) shows that these modi cannot be given in presen-
tations but that they are asserted by propositions. Anyway,
it has been well known for a long time — Hume and Kant
were conscious of it — that they (modi) cannot be given in
any presentation, and even that these expressions are ’con-
tentless’; they express only someone’s reaction to a certain
state of aﬀairs. [Czeżowski 1965, 38-39, my translation]
According to these considerations, I think that the sentence: ‘a is
valuable’ means
‘It is valuable that a exists’.
And the last sentence means the same as the sentence
8The word ‘is’ occurring in the expression ‘Some x is a’ denotes the relation of
membership if ‘a’ is a general term, or the relation of identity if ‘a’ is a singular term.
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‘It is valuable that for some x: x is a’.
Thus, Czeżowski’s view is that such expressions as ‘exists’, ‘valuable’,
‘good’, ’beautiful’ but also ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ are not predicates
(of the ﬁrst level at least), and, therefore, they do not denote any proper-
ties of things or individuals. However, sentences containing them are not
necessarily false because they assert that what was called in the Middle
Ages ’ways of being’ (modi essendi) .
But it is not clear what modi essendi are. The above quotation says
that modi essendi are represented by sentential functors but also that
they are asserted by propositions. Therefore, we may ask: if they are not
properties what might they be? Are they correlates of sentences which
are built by means of relevant sentential functors — axiological functors
— i.e., are they states of aﬀairs or facts of a special kind or are they
only correlates of sentential functors?
If they (modi essendi) are correlates of sentential functors, then they
cannot be states of aﬀairs because expressions representing states of af-
fairs (sentences) can be transformed by such an operation as, for example
nominalization made by the word ‘that’, and sentential functors cannot
be transformed in that way. The result of the nominalization of the sen-
tence ‘Peter is truthful’ is the expression ‘that Peter is truthful’ which
can be the subject of a sentence, for example, ‘that Peter is truthful
is good’, but the result of the nominalization of the functor ‘it is true
that. . . ’ is the meaningless expression ‘that it is true that. . . ’, which
still is in need of completion.
Therefore, let us assume that modi essendi including values are cor-
relates of sentences, that is that values (and existence) are facts.
Then, however, complex sentences would presumably have their own
propositional correlates. This would also concern the sentences:
‘It is true that Peter is truthful’
and
‘It is good that Peter is truthful’.
Let us represent the sentence ‘Peter is truthful’ as ‘p’. And now,
one may argue that, if modi essendi are really states of aﬀairs, then the
correlates of sentences ‘It is good that p’, ‘It is good that it is good
that p’ and ‘It is good that it is good that it is good that p’ and so on
are states of aﬀairs as well. Then, however, one may pose the question:
what is the diﬀerence between two sentences ’It is good that p’ and ‘It
is good that it is good that p’? If there were no diﬀerence between the
sentences in question, then it would mean that they do not have their
own correlates either because they have no correlates at all, and then
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there are no values, or, because they have one and the same correlate
and a candidate for such a correlate could be p9. But it would mean
that there are no values either since p is a natural fact and we excluded
from the very beginning that axiological propositions can be inferred
from natural propositions; that is from propositions related to natural
facts.
I think that there are at least two possible answers to the above
question10.
(1) One can render the sentence ‘It is good that it is good that p’
(this sentence also may be read as ‘It is good that p is good’)
as a metalanguage sentence saying something about the ﬁrst level
sentence ‘It is good that p’ (‘p is good’), but it is not clear what in
fact the second level sentence “It is good that ‘it is good that p’ ”
says about the ﬁrst level sentence ‘It is good that p’.
Let us note that in the case of ‘truth’ in the complex metalanguage
sentence such as for example “It is true that ‘today is Friday’ is
true” the situation is a little bit diﬀerent and more understandable
than in the case of ‘good’. The ﬁrst occurrence of truth in the
last sentence would be objectual, and, according to the classical
conception of truth, would concern the existence of the state of
aﬀairs: Today is Friday, and the second occurrence of truth would
refer to the metalanguage concept of truth, and would concern the
ﬁrst level sentence. The case of truth, however, is insuﬃcient for
making clear the point with regard to values (goodness): the sec-
ond level sentence “It is good that ‘It is good that p’ ” would say
that the ﬁrst level sentence ‘It is good that p’ is good. The sec-
ond occurrence of ‘good’ in the considered metalanguage sentence
9I’m grateful to Manuel Rebuschi for his remark that if the expression ‘it is good
that. . . ” were interpreted as a modal functor (see also note 10 and 15 below), then
there would obtain the equivalence between Gp and GGp (Gp means ‘it is good that
p’); such a logical relation is valid in the modal systems S4 and S5. However, these
systems do not admit the equivalence between both formulas and p, because it would
be a case of the collapse of modalities.
10I do not exclude, in principle, a third possible answer to the question discussed;
modi essendi (axiological functors) could be interpreted as usual modal functors
(@,♦), that means not only as sentential functors, but as intensional functors. If we
interpret modi essendi in this way, we automatically get the irreducibility of axiolog-
ical sentences to natural sentences because of intensionality of modal logic. However,
Czeżowski himself, could not accept such an interpretation because of his reservations
to intensional logic. That reservation to intensional contexts was typical of the Lvov-
Warsaw School. But, the interpretation of axiological functors in terms of intensional
logic might enable us to see the true originality of Czeżowski’s account of values and
axiological sentences.
Metaphysics of Axiological Realism 67
would apply to the fact p.
Whatever the word ‘good’ may stand for, certainly the concept of
good related to a sentence has no moral or, more generally, axi-
ological sense, and that would concern not only the second level
concept of good but also higher level concepts resulting from the
progressing iteration of the ﬁrst level sentence (to be more precise:
of the functor ‘it is good. . . ’).
(2) The metalanguage interpretation of the word ‘good’ occurring in
complex sentences is not the only possible one. There is a clear
diﬀerence between the sentence ‘Peter’s truthfulness is good’ and
the sentence ‘It is good that Peter’s truthfulness is good’. It seems
that in the last case we do not say something about the sentence
but about the world which is such that Peter’s truthfulness is good
in it, perhaps, even we say that the world is good since it contains
as its constituent a given good state of aﬀairs.
Therefore, in my view, the very possibility of iteration of axiological
propositions (or facts) is not a suﬃcient reason to eliminate the proposi-
tional interpretation of values regarded as states of aﬀairs. I think that
the above analysis shows also that it is at least possible that there is a
diﬀerence between iterated axiological sentences of diﬀerent levels, and
hence it is at least possible that they have their own correlates11.
11Another possible reason why modi essendi can be regarded as states of aﬀairs
may be the following one. Modi essendi are ways (perhaps one may say ’forms’) in
which object’s properties are bound together. For example green can be related to
other properties of an object in such a way that it will be evaluated as a beautiful one.
Pleasure can be related to other properties (of an object’s behavior) in such a way
that the behavior will be evaluated as a good one [Wiśniewski 1992, 143]. The way in
which objects are related one to another is sometimes called a ’state of aﬀairs’. But
I think it is not a correct view. True, the way in which properties are related one to
another in a given object may be regarded as a state of aﬀairs, but it is not identical
with an object’s value, say, with its beauty because beauty is that what an aesthetic
sentence asserts about the way in which properties are related one to another. For
example, the way properties are related one to another is asserted by the sentence
‘White contrasts with black in Rembrandt’s painting’, but the beauty of the relation
between the colors is asserted in the sentence ‘It is beautiful that white and black are
in relation one to another in Rembrandt’s painting’ or in the sentence ‘The contrast
between white and black colors in Rembrandt’s painting is beautiful’. If the relation
between properties in a given object were identical with its value, then, arguably, the
two sentences mentioned above, would not be diﬀerent in meaning and the ﬁrst one
might have been replaced by the second one. The result that modi essendi are not the
ways in which properties or objects are related one to another does not preclude that
modi essendi are states of aﬀairs; modi essendi can be higher axiological facts which
supervenes on an inferior natural fact (a way properties are related one to another).
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6 Transcendental concept of values
The conclusion that values are facts or can be regarded as facts could not,
however, be accepted by Czeżowski because he very seriously treated his
statement that the functor of the assertion ‘it is true that. . . ’ is a functor
of existence, and that the functor of evaluation ‘it is valuable that. . . ’
is the functor of value [Czeżowski 1965, 69]. This was the direct con-
sequence of the deﬁnition of truth, according to which, a proposition is
true if there exists a referent of the subject that the proposition is about.
Since existence and values are not properties and cannot be presented,
then they cannot be states of aﬀairs (facts) because the latter can be
presented. A state of aﬀairs is just a complex object of a presentation
upon which a relevant judgment is based, and it usually has the form
aRb (where ‘R’ stands for a relation which in principle is thinkable: can
be deﬁned in terms of the set theory) 12. Thus, the existence of a fact
and not the fact of existence is asserted by an assertoric proposition,
and, similarly, the value of a fact and not the fact of value is asserted by
an axiological proposition.
However, if values are not individuals, not properties (and not facts),
and expressions representing them in language are contentless (mean-
ingless), then, one may suppose that there are no values at all, and that
axiological antirealism is right13. To avoid such a conclusion and to de-
fend realism Czeżowski resorts to transcendental concepts and regards
modi essendi as transcendentalia. Transcendentalia do not belong to the
description of an object, that is: they do not determine universals and
cannot be deﬁned, (in Brentanian terms: they cannot be presented) and,
hence, they are no properties in Czeżowski’s psycho-ontology. However,
one should add that they are not nothing. Since existence and values are
not properties either, then — Czeżowski might have concluded — they
can be regarded as transcendentalia [Czeżowski 1977, 2004]14 .
12Of course someone may postulate unthinkable facts lying beyond the capacity
of presentation but it would make Czeżowski’s psycho-ontology incoherent (a fact
which does not make any addition to the description of objects involved in it cannot
be presented, and hence cannot be regarded as a fact).
13In Poland Ossowska stressed this point strongly: axiological propositions intend
to assert something but they fail, and, therefore, they all are false [Ossowska 1966,
124].
14Czeżowski followed, however, not Thomas Aquinas but Duns Scotus by claiming
that transcendentalia are disjunctive. But he denied also Duns Scotus theory when
he was saying that existence and values are disjunctive because they can be negated;
the negation of goodness is evil and the negation of beauty is ugliness. He suspended
also the thesis that transcendental concepts, for example existence and goodness
are convertible. The question about convertibility of transcendental concepts may be
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In sum, the essential role in the controversy between non-naturalistic
realism and antirealism is played by the claim that values (goodness,
beauty) are not object’s properties (and not facts). Therefore, goodness
and beauty cannot be identical with any natural property or with any
natural fact. Truthfulness, kindness, sacriﬁce, justice, lie, faithfulness,
harmony etc. are not values but they are natural properties, and, as
Czeżowski calls them, they are ‘criteria of goodness’, ‘criteria of evil’,
‘criteria of beauty’, or more generally, ‘criteria of values’ [Czeżowski
1989, 107].
I think that the relation between sentence, value and state of aﬀairs
might be as follows: a state of aﬀairs is the correlate of a sentence and
the value (or existence) of a state of aﬀairs is asserted by a complex
sentence built by the sentential functor ‘it is valuable that. . . ’ (or ‘it is
true that. . . ’).
7 Some possible objections against Czeżowski’s
axiological realism
Values can be regarded as modi essendi provided that it is possible to
demonstrate that the sentence:
It is valuable that Σx(x = a) (*)
is a faithful translation of the sentence
a is valuable. (**)
A faithful translation is to be understood as a synonymous and, hence,
a logically equivalent translation. If we read the particular quantiﬁer
occurring in the sentence (*) in the existential way, then the sentence
(*) will be false if ‘a’ stands for a ﬁctional object, and, therefore, the
proposed translation will not be faithful [Gorzka 1991, 21–22].
However, this objection can be removed, if we relate existence to a
model. We may say about each (non-contradictory) object that it exists
in a certain model but, of course not always that the model will be the
real world15.
answered empirically by means of experience and not a priori by means of deduction.
Jan Woleński gave the analysis of the relation between Duns Scotus and Czeżowski’s
approach to the problem of transcendental concepts [Woleński 2004].
15Such a move implies a change in the understanding of the Brentanist concept of
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Next, someone may argue: it does not matter whether axiological
expressions are predicates or sentential functors because it is still possible
that they only express mental attitudes or emotions, and they do not
refer to any reality. The response to this objection is that since axi-
ological knowledge is possible (in the sense that its theoretical model
is not inconsistent, and Czeżowski provided such a model), then the
class of referents of axiological expressions, whatever they might be,
is not necessarily empty, and that it is better for some reasons (the
best explanation of the existence of inferences in the domain of axiolog-
ical discourse) to claim that axiological expressions have referents in the
reality than to claim that they have no referents.
One may also say that axiological expressions regarded as sentential
functors are only apparent sentential functors because in fact they are
predicates, and one should translate the sentence:
‘It is good that Peter is truthful’
into the sentence:
‘Peter’s truthfulness is good’.
The response from Czeżowski’s position would be that if ‘good’ were
a predicate, then it could be deﬁned in terms of natural predicates or
being (ens) and makes it more similar to the Tomist concept of ens, according to
which, an object or being is that what exists (and not only that what is given in a
(re) presentation). An object which exists in the real world will not exist in a world of
ﬁction, and conversely, but since it exists somewhere and somehow, it is a being. The
relativisation of existence to a model allows to preserve the validity of the principle of
existential generalization obtaining in the ﬁrst level predicate logic (Pa →
P
xPx)
in intentional discourse as well. The last fact is an additional argument for making
such a step. Czeżowski himself made such a move in his later works [Łukasiewicz
2004]. The negation of existence in the sentence ‘a does not exist’ would amount to
the exclusion of an object from the domain of a model. However, it is also worth
noting that if axiological functors were interpreted as usual modal operators (Note
9), then it would be possible to claim that
Σx (it is valuable that (x = a)) (***)
is the faithful translation of (*). One could then choose between a dicto and a de re
interpretation of (*). Moreover, if modi essendi were interpreted as modalities, then
a standard ‘objectual’ interpretation of the quaniﬁer
P
x would not imply that ‘a’
refers in the actual world. If one would consider ‘it is valuable that. . . ’ as a modal
operator, let us say [ν], one could use Kripke’s possible worlds semantics to account
for it: [ν]ϕ is true at a world w, iﬀ ϕ is true in every world w’ reachable from w.
One need not postulate that if [ν]ϕ is true in the actual world, then ϕ is true in the
actual world: some valuable facts might be non actual (like: soldiers stopping wars).
It means that the actual world is not reachable from itself along the ‘[ν]-lines’. Then,
one could consider valuable worlds with other beings than the actual ones (ﬁctional
beings included).
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properties. But it is not the case, and hence the word ‘good’ is an
apparent predicate.
The next problem is that Czeżowski regards for example justice,
truthfulness or faithfulness as natural properties, and by doing it he is
not able to recognize axiological (normative) character of these expres-
sions. He himself would have responded, I suppose, that these natural
properties retain axiological nature because they may be criteria of val-
ues.
Axiological realism is based on some assumptions concerning the
structure of language; language is understood as containing expressions
belonging to diﬀerent syntactic categories: namely to predicates and sen-
tential functors. However, such an assumption is not true for all natural
languages, and therefore, at most, we may speak about realism in rela-
tion to a certain type of language. I think that the objection is right.
The only possible form of axiological realism, if we may call it in that
way, is ‘internal axiological realism’.
8 Conclusions
Czeżowski’s conceptions of values reconstructed above can be considered
both from historical and systematic points of view. From the historical
point of view, Czeżowski’s proposal is above all a development of Twar-
dowski’s ideas. Twardowski was a metaphysical and axiological realist,
but he virulently defended Brentano’s idiogenetic theory of judgment
and treated values as the object’s properties. However, it seems that the
acceptance of the following three propositions:
(1) Axiological sentences are true or false;
(2) Judgment is not a combination of a subject and a predicate;
(3) Values are properties
is logically impossible. The acceptance of (1) and (2) entails the rejection
of (3), and Czeżowski accepted propositions (1) and (2) but replaced
(3) by its negation: Values are not properties. Thus, his revision of
Twardowski’s views makes them coherent and at least logically tenable.
It is interesting from the systematic point of view to which extent
Czeżowski’s proposal meets one of the most vividly discussed issues in
the ﬁled of contemporary metaphysics of axiology, that is the problem of
supervenience. According to Czeżowski, values and the object’s natural
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properties are ontologically distinct becausemodi essendi are regarded as
transcendentalia, and, hence not as properties16. However, at the same
time values depend on the object’s natural properties; it is not possi-
ble that the natural properties do not change if the values do change.
In other words, values (in Czeżowski’s case modi essendi) supervene on
properties. The problem is that a non-naturalist is not able to explain
this fact: the fact of an ontological dependence of values upon natural
properties and the fact of an ontological diﬀerence between values and
properties. A naturalist can explain supervenience by the assumption
that values are reducible to natural (non-axiological) properties. This
kind of explanation is not accessible to Czeżowski since values and prop-
erties belong to diﬀerent ontological categories. Czeżowski never consid-
ered the problem of supervinience, and, hence, we may only speculate
what he would have responded to the problem in question. He could
have argued that the naturalist’s reasoning must be unsound because it
proves too much. It is so becasue the form of the argument seems to
generalize into an argument that no class of entities can supervene on
another class of entities unless the former are reducible to the latter in
some way. But this cannot be a correct view in all cases of supervie-
nience. According to the idiogenetic theory of judgment, a judgment
supervenes on a presentation but a judgment cannot be reduced to any
presentation, and the same have to be said about values and properties.
Irrespective of whether such an approach to the problem of superve-
nienice is satisfactory, Czeżowski’s solution based on the medieval meta-
physics and the Brentanian psycho-ontology provides a bold enrichment
of the metaphysics of axiology, and constitutes an original achievement
of Brentano’s school and in particular of the Polish Brentanism.
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